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Abstract
We investigated the role automated behavior plays in
contributing to security breaches. Using different
forms of phishing, combined with multiple
neurophysiological tools, we were able to more fully
understand the approaches participants took when
they engaged with a phishing campaign. The four
participants of this pilot study ranged in their
individual characteristics of gender and IT
experience while controlling for age. It seems the
biggest factor for awareness and successfully
resisting a phishing campaign may be proximity of
security training to engagement with that campaign.
Neurophysiological tools helped illustrate the
thought processes behind participants’ statements
and actions; combined with consideration of
individual characteristics, these tools help shed more
light on human behavior. In the future, we plan to
further enhance our testing environment by
incorporating an emergent model that considers
work task complexity and incorporate more industry
participants with a range of IT experience.

1. Introduction
Samantha needed to work on a large file at home.
It was too big to email, so she absent-mindedly
plugged a flash drive someone had left in the break
room into her desktop’s USB port. This was not an
issue for her since she had used the flash drive plenty
of times in the past. She had logged on with her
password, and the company’s email client was open.
This simple act started a chain reaction, launching
malware hidden on the flash drive that propagated by
attaching a copy of the malignant code to every email
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she sent. Within hours, the corporate network was
thoroughly compromised.
The above hypothetical vignette illustrates an
important insight that eludes many Information
Technology (IT) managers tasked with cybersecurity:
many breaches occur when users are not consciously
aware of what they are doing. Also, contrary to recent
headlines, not all threats in the cyber realm are
malicious in nature. According to a Ponemon study,
70% of US survey respondents and 64% of German
respondents stated that more security incidents were
caused by unintentional mistakes rather than
malicious acts [1]. This is happening in an era when
we have clear organizational guidelines pertaining to
mandatory Security Education, Training, and
Awareness (SETA) programs. We contend that most
of these unintentional mistakes are due to habitual
behavior that promotes an automatic response. This
response may vary based on the experience of
individuals.
Previous research supports the idea that
automated behavior results from the force of habit [24]. It is a given that understanding and linking these
automated behaviors more clearly to design features
may be highly valuable. But, it is also important to
investigate the role a person’s experience may play in
promoting automated behavior. Can the behavior of a
novice and an expert be visualized and compared in a
cybersecurity context? This issue needs to be
developed for any meaningful modeling and
advancement in SETA programs. It is also important
to investigate the efficacy of training based on
individual groups. Does one-size-fits-all training
really work? Interestingly, traditional research in
human computer interaction has examined the design
and usability components of technology as intended
rather than the use/impact cycle [5]. However, by
under-emphasizing the use/impact cycle of
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technology, researchers have predominantly ignored
the impact that automated behavior may have.
The purpose of our study was to gauge user
behavior by visualizing the brains of users of varied
technical experiences in the context of potential
phishing attacks. We designed and executed an
experiment in which participants were tasked with
work-related exercises while being monitored and
connected to a suite of neurophysiological tools (e.g.,
electroencephalography [EEG], eye tracking, and
facial encoding of emotion by web camera).
In this paper, we present the results of our pilot
study using neurophysiological tools to gain a more
complete understanding of human behavior in a work
context while individuals interacted with emails
covertly staged as a phishing attack. The next section
provides the motivation and basis of our argument
that unintentional mistakes are due to automated
behavior, which may be due to individual differences
in experience. We report the results of our EEG
analysis and provide examples of the additional
neurophysiological data collected. We also present an
emergent model that we plan to integrate with what
we have already done as part of our future research.
Finally, we discuss the implications of incorporating
neurophysiological tools into security research to
improve SETA programs.

propose adapting the Martin-Morich model of
consumer behavior (shown in Figure 1) to develop an
improved approach to cybersecurity.

Figure 1: Martin-Morich Model

2.1 The Determinants of Habitual Behavior

2. Martin-Morich Model of Consumer
Behavior Adapted to Cybersecurity
Compelling research from diverse fields including
neuroscience, cognitive, social and behavioral
psychology, and behavioral economics, reveals that
most human behavior is predominantly the result of
unconscious mental processes. When a person is in a
familiar situation doing repetitive tasks, behavior
rapidly becomes automatic, not open to conscious
control. This research challenges the conventional
wisdom embedded in most models of human
behavior that posit humans are rational agents
making conscious decisions.
The impact of these research streams to
cybersecurity is profound. At the core of all
cybersecurity assumptions is that users are capable of
following directions that require conscious attention
to behaviors performed in highly habitual settings.
From this perspective, it seems logical to assume that
explaining cybersecurity policies to users should be
sufficient to obtain compliance. Yet, a high
percentage of cybersecurity breaches are caused by
unconscious user behavior, which is immune to all
appeals that rely on conscious mind attention and
control. Similar to other recent work in IS [6], we

Habits are automatic behaviors that are activated
by cues in a stable context independent of goals and
intentions. They are pre-potent, quick to activate, do
not require conscious intervention, and are persistent
[7]. The Martin-Morich model posits a dynamic
process where the conscious and unconscious minds
both participate in guiding decisions and behavior.
Decisions and behaviors that are made repeatedly in
stable contexts become increasingly habitual.
Decisions and behaviors that are novel or occur in
situations that are not familiar are more heavily
influenced by the conscious mind. The model is
designed to more closely reflect real world
experiences where habitual behaviors can be
disrupted by something that gets the attention of the
conscious mind, and even highly complex behaviors
can become habitual with sufficient repetitions.
Because the model describes a dynamic process,
there is not a clear beginning or end. Behaviors under
analysis might be new or ongoing for years. The
model is designed to describe the process by which
behavior becomes habitual over time and how it is
possible to disrupt established habits. In the next few
sections we provide an explanation of the tenets of
the model.
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2.1.1 Level of Automation

2.1.3 Co-pilot

Behavior is the culmination of a complex
interplay between conscious and unconscious mental
processes. The Martin-Morich model places behavior
along a continuum of habit formation, with fully
conscious behavior (pilot mode) on one end, and
completely automatic behavior (autopilot mode) on
the other. Between these extremes are heuristics (copilot mode) where simple rules govern behavior in
familiar situations with multiple plausible behavioral
responses. Contrary to human perception, most
behavior is generated from the autopilot side of the
spectrum [8].
It is important to understand the intensity of the
habitual behavior under study to comprehend the risk
profile for violating cybersecurity policies and
procedures. Behavior that leads to high levels of
habituation will inadvertently create greater security
risks.

Co-pilot mode describes behaviors that have been
repeated in stable environments but introduce
conditional changes. For example, at the grocery
store a shopper might develop a heuristic to stock up
when a particular item goes on sale. Heuristics are
quite common in working with information systems
as users develop shortcuts based on varying
responses from programs, devices and other users.
Most users receive a large volume of emails every
day and unconsciously develop heuristics about
which emails get responses. For example, an
employee may reply to an email in an order that is
dependent on who sent it. An urgent email from a
supervisor may dictate first response, whereas
messages from unidentifiable resources may be
deleted. In this scenario, an attacker may assume that
an employee has certain heuristics, and therefore may
create a message that spoofs a supervisor.
The conscious and unconscious minds work
together to solve innumerable tasks throughout the
day. Heuristics are simplified decision sets that can
be described as the conscious mind intervening
minimally to perform an action that is familiar.
Heuristics also represent a threat to security because
the conscious mind may not be sufficiently engaged
to properly understand the security implications of a
given behavior. For example, people in buildings that
require badges to unlock doors might hold open the
door for a woman, an elderly person, or someone
with their hands full.

2.1.2 Pilot Mode
Pilot mode describes behaviors that are entirely or
largely under the influence of the conscious mind.
Pilot mode is engaged in novel situations where
established behavioral repertoires do not exist and in
situations that are highly important, highly salient, or
highly risky.
To engage in conscious thought requires effort,
and the conscious mind fatigues rapidly. This is a
primary flaw in most security assumptions. There is a
pervasive naïve presumption that users will follow
security practices if they understand them, and if
punishments are in place if they do not. “The
defining feature of System 2 (the conscious mind) is
that its operations are effortful, and one of its main
characteristics is laziness….” [9]. It is this laziness
that causes the conscious mind to shift familiar tasks
to the unconscious mind as quickly as possible.
A good cybersecurity example of this is
passwords. Rules for passwords include not using the
same password for multiple accounts and not using
easy to remember passwords. In other words,
passwords are designed to work against the way the
brain works. Predictably, the most frequent calls to
IT help lines is forgotten passwords [10]. Due to this
reason, employees also have a tendency to share
passwords in a team setting [11]. However, that is
due to not only the password being difficult to recall,
but due to an element of trust that exists as being part
of a team [12].

2.1.4 Autopilot
Autopilot mode represents behaviors that are
repeated automatically without the need for
conscious involvement. The transition from
conscious to unconscious action can be seen in
learning to type, where the conscious mind is at first
heavily taxed, but quickly shifts learning of finger
placement to the unconscious. The conscious mind
thinks the word, the unconscious mind types. Once
learned, the user’s typing speed is negatively
impacted by the intrusion of the conscious mind, as
when a user looks at the keyboard.
Autopilot mode works outside of conscious
awareness, and its workings are not available to
conscious introspection. This means that a user may
perform a behavior unknowingly that violates a
policy that they understand and agree with. An
example of this is Microsoft’s Windows operating
system. In attempting to make Windows more secure,
the designers forced users to click an “allow” button
before tasks that might open up the computer to
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intrusion. But the ‘allow’ button was activated for
numerous routine permissions, causing acceptance to
become unconscious. This new habit defeats the
purpose and effectiveness of this cybersecurity
solution.
The unconscious mind works automatically and
effortlessly; a user cannot turn it off. This means to a
large degree even when someone is consciously
interacting with an information system, there is still a
significant amount of information being processed by
the unconscious mind. Often what the user might
describe as a Pilot decision is simply the conscious
mind accepting a decision presented by the habitual
mind. Moreover, because the conscious mind
requires will and effort, it exhausts rapidly. Expecting
users to remain consciously vigilant in highly
contextualized environments is unrealistic.
Habits form in stable contexts; situations that
become familiar through unchanging repetition—like
most workspaces. Established contexts signals the
conscious brain that it does not have to pay attention;
that routines that have worked before can be executed
without conscious mind attention. Anyone who
works in front of a computer screen for hours at a
time, looking at the same programs, the same walls,
sitting in the same chair for hours a day forms a
uniquely powerful context. This is the central
challenge to all efforts at cybersecurity; the very
nature of working with PCs and programs puts
people in highly habit-forming contexts. Considering
that one of the greatest threats an organization faces
is from insiders [13], employees in a highly
contextualized environment may be so used to
sharing their passwords with team mates, that may
inadvertently share it with someone who they initially
may not have trusted. Password sharing continues to
be a serious issue even though security education and
training campaigns are carried out by organizations
on a regular basis [14].

would be to absent-mindedly click on a link [15] that
could be a part of a phishing campaign. However, as
explained in the autopilot section, it is the
unconscious mind that is ultimately making that
decision. Vishwanath et al. [16] suggested that
habitual patterns of IT interactions with high levels of
email load influenced an individual’s likelihood of
being phished.

2.1.5 Cues

3. Testing Environment and Results

Cues are stimuli that have become triggers of
habitual behavior in contextualized situations. The
human brain is inundated with millions of stimuli, the
vast majority of which are not processed by the
conscious mind. However, when a behavior becomes
closely associated with a context, specific stimuli
become cues that trigger that behavior, such as
responding instantly to an email. Cues are often built
into information systems to create a desired behavior,
such as a distinct sound to alert the user that a task
needs to be performed. Once users become trained to
automatically respond to a cue, they may respond to
that cue inappropriately. A common example of this

We had an opportunity to pilot test our concept in a
controlled environment. This section provides a
description of the environment and the results.

2.1.6 Feedback
Feedback is anything that occurs after a behavior
has the potential to be viewed as a consequence of
that behavior. Outcomes that increase the likelihood
that a behavior will be repeated are termed
reinforcing. Those that make a behavior less likely to
occur are termed punishing. This is how the
unconscious mind learns, by associating an act with a
result. The closer in time between action and
feedback, the more powerful the association [17].
Generally speaking the purpose of security policies is
to ensure compliance via a feedback mechanism [18].
Though this technique has worked in the past, in the
mobile cloud computing environment cybersecurity
compliance continues to be a major concern [19].
Velte et al. [20] specified the ease of working in the
cloud computing environment due to a plethora of
applications [20]. However, in an organization setting
regardless of convenience, security of mobile based
cloud applications is a concern [21]. Delays between
a request and feedback can be especially problematic
as it would impact the user experience and later use
of applications. [22]. The role of habit in this setting
was highlighted by Venkatesh, et al. [23]) who found
that, after 3 months using an IS, the only significant
predictor of later use was prior use; other factors
were insignificant. It has also been stated that there is
a correlation between ease of use of a system and
habit formation [24].

3.1 Experimental Procedure
We designed a virtual environment for each
participant. The participant side incorporated
Windows and Linux desktop environments with a
web server and a self-contained email system. We
also used a separate virtual environment that housed
goPhish, which is an open source phishing
framework. At no point did the participants interact
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with the goPhish environment. Each participant was
tasked with certain exercises that were considered to
be a part of their work. These tasks included
conducting online searches related to work events
and reviewing memos about new work policies.
Some tasks requested sending related emails to help
simulate an employee interacting with their inbox.
While those tasks were being carried out, we sent
multiple phishing attempts. The first attempt was for
a participant to reset their password by providing
their existing password. The second focused on them
updating their health benefits and logging into a
single sign-on system The third email highlighted a
merger between their company and another one,
whereby requiring some personal information. The
fourth and last phishing attempt asked each
participant to use their Gmail account to enable
access to the new single sign-on system.
Before interacting with the email system,
participants underwent an informed consent
procedure where they knew their email habits would
be monitored using a suite of neurophysiological
tools. Then, they were fitted with an electrode cap
for recording their brainwaves and participated in
calibration of an eye tracker where the first two
participants used eye tracking glasses and the second
two used a remote eye tracking system, both
developed by Tobii (www.tobii.com).
During the participant’s interaction with the email
system, sixteen channels of EEG were recorded using
the research-grade BioSemi Active Two bioamplifier
system (http://www.cortechsolutions.com/Products/
Physiological-data-acquisition/Systems/
ActiveTwo.aspx) connected to a PC. The electrode
cap was configured according to the widely used 1020 system of electrode placement [25]. Active
electrodes were placed on the cap to allow for the
recording of brain activations down-sampled at 256
Hz using a Common Average Reference (CAR). The
sixteen recorded channels were: frontal-polar (Fp1,
Fp2), frontal-central (FC3, FCz, FC4), central (C3,
Cz, C4), temporal-parietal (TP7, TP8), parietal (P3,
Pz, P4), and occipital (O1, Oz, O2).
In addition to EEG and eye tracking data, we also
recorded the small muscular movements in the face
using a web camera to detect emotion, cursor
movements and mouse-clicks, and all audio and
video of the interaction through the iMotions
software suite for syncing biometric data
(www.imotions.com). At the end, participants were
given a brief survey to collect basic demographic
information and inquire about their risk propensity
and computer playfulness. Each session lasted about
an hour.

3.2 Sample
We had six participants as summarized in Table 1.
There were 3 males and 3 females with an average
age of 37 years and all except one with 10-15 or more
years of work experience. Participants 1 and 2
worked for over five years within the IT field and
were currently working within the field, whereas
Participants 3 and 4 were non-IT workers.
Participant 3 was working as a leadership and
communications coach for undergraduate students,
Participant 4 was working as a graduate research
assistant in BioChemistry and was a former high
school Chemistry teacher, and Participant 5 was an
office business manager. Although Participant 6 was
the youngest participant, he had relevant IT work
experience.
Table 1: Participant Demographics
No.

Gender

Age

Field

1

M

39

IT

2

F

41

IT

3

M

37

Non-IT

4

F

44

Non-IT

5

F

36

Non-IT

6

M

22

IT

These individuals were purposive sampled to
represent males and females within a more mature
age range from IT and from outside of the IT field
and hence arguably less familiar with security
protocols.
These individuals should not have
experienced cognitive decline associated with aging
and yet were old enough that their brains had settled
into a stable level of myelination indicative of
matured brain function. Further, studies have shown
that younger individuals are inherently riskier [26], a
bias we wished to avoid.
3.3 Results and Discussion
The goPhish dashboard provided us with all
information that the participants were entering in
their virtual environment. Figure 2 provides an
overview of the results for Participant 1. As the
figure shows, we were able to track if a participant
not only opened an email, but also if they clicked any
of the links, or submitted any data.
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Figure 2: Participant 1
It was interesting to note that even though they had
expertise in IT, Participants 1 and 2 fell for all
phishing campaigns. Participant 3 as the figure below
shows, opened the emails, but did not click any of the
links, nor did he provide any information. We later
discovered that he had just conducted his annual
security training within two weeks of participation;
the training was still salient in his mind of what were
legitimate emails and not, indicated by statements
such as, “Trying to get me to go to my personal
Gmail... That dog won’t hunt!” and with further
reflection, “Corporate wanting me to go to Gmail was
really sketchy.”

Figure 3: Participant 3
Participant 4 on the other hand as the figure shows,
did click on all the links that were part of the
phishing campaign and provided information for the
password reset and financial information update. She
seemed to sense things were going awry for her
behavior saying at the end, “I’m sorta feeling like this
guy at the end, a sucker [emphasized with laughter].”

Figure 4: Participant 4
Figures 5 and 6 reflect the actions of our final two
participants.

Figure 5: Participant 5

Figure 6: Participant 6
Participant 5 as the Figure above shows, did not click
on any of the phishing attempts, where as our final
participant did fall for the financial information
gathering phishing attempt.
Recordings from the sixteen channels of scalp
electrodes were analyzed offline using a previouslyvalidated technique for brain localization and
associated software: standardized low resolution
brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) [27].
This analysis was conducted for each of the six
participants. Figure 5 presents topological plots of
neural activations across participants’ scalps analyzed
for the duration of their activity. These activations
are presented on a fixed scale such that brighter areas
with yellow indicate highest levels of activation. For
each grouping of topological plots, the image on the
top row in the center is a back-end view of the brain
whereas the image on the bottom row in the center is
a front-on view of the brain (with the view indicated
in small font in the bottom right corner). Among
other things, higher activation in the left hemisphere
may indicate stronger positive approach to the
activity whereas higher activation in the right
hemisphere may indicate negative approach to the
activity [28].
The topological plots are all rather different with
the exception of Participants 1 and 4 with greatest
activation in their prefrontal cortex, an area that has
been associated with decision making and planning
complex behaviors. Yet these participants are rather
different in individual characteristics. Participant 1 is
male with many years of IT experience and familiar
with virtual environments and security procedures,
and Participant 4 is female and self-described as non-
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astute with technology. The cognitive difference
between these individuals is that Participant 1 shows
greater activity on the right hemisphere of his frontal
lobe indicating conscious thinking about his actions
and judgement of the activities while perhaps
reflecting the frustration he felt with the technical
environment and its slow performance. Participant 4
may also have this conscious-level of thinking about
the activity but she was laughing at herself
throughout and this degree of self-amusement may be
the slight hemispheric difference shown favoring the
left hemisphere.
Participant 2 had greatest activation in her
occipital lobe associated with visual processing. She
made statements like, “I just could look at my inbox
and see that I didn’t need to click on any of those
emails.” Unfortunately, this statement is not in line
with her actions as she did in fact click on them. This
is where analysis of her qualitative statements may
point to her clicking on emails to verify her notions
rather than actually falling for the campaign which
would be indicated by her dashboard report. The
lack of frontal lobe activity may indicate the neural
efficiency of an expert as her role is to educate and
secure networks at her job. Further, a positive
approach to the activity is indicated by greater
activation in the left hemisphere and was reinforced
by her smiling through the activity.
The EEG results of Participant 3 are interesting in
the context of the study because the greatest
activation appears in the superior frontal gyrus of the
frontal lobe, an area associated with higher cognitive
functions such as working memory. It is possible
that his brain topography is a reflection of him trying
to recall what he was typing in an email because the
system crashed on him while he was composing
emails before he had an opportunity to save them as
drafts which he verbalized to researchers.
Participants 5 and 6 had greatest activation in
their frontal lobe but in different areas; Participant 5
had greatest activation in her inferior temporal gyrus
(a.k.a. the IT cortex but not because of an association
with information technology) whereas Participant 6
had greatest activation in his middle frontal gyrus.
The IT cortex is associated with processing visual
stimuli and matching of color and form. This
participant seemed to be more engrossed with a
particular task to identify t-shirts for a work function.
Contrastingly, the middle frontal gyrus is associated
with attention. Particularly, the right middle frontal
gyrus, as is highlighted for Participant 6, has been
tied to numeracy or the ability to conduct numerical
operations [29]. Here we may be seeing evidence of
this participant’s difficulty in keeping track of which
task he was on as he was observed repeatedly

shuffling the task papers and verifying that he had
conducted the earlier tasks.
Participant 1

Participant 2

Participant 3

Participant 4

Participant 5
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Participant 6

insights to their thought processes and behavior.
With further study, we may see trends across
individual characteristics and experiences and better
target interventions.

3.4 Participant Survey

Scale

Figure 5: Topological Plots of EEG
Activations for Participants
Figure 6 illustrates results that may be obtained from
eye tracking to generate heatmaps of a participant’s
attention. These heatmaps show similar patterns for
Participants 1 and 2 scanning the Inbox with their
eyes and yet this contrasts with how they were
mentally processing the experience. Further, eye
tracking allows us to confirm engagement with the
interface. In addition to EEG and eye tracking data,
we were able to obtain stimulus-synced assessments
of emotion ranging from joy to anger based on facial
encoding of slight muscular movements recorded by
web camera. We do not report here the results of
these additionally-edifying measures to instead focus
on the richness that EEG may provide to a study.

Experiment participants completed a short
survey, which asked them about their general risk
perceptions, computer playfulness, and specific risk
perception.
For general risk perceptions, participants were
asked to indicate 1, 2 or 3 where 1=During most of
my life, I found dangerous or risky situations
exhilarating and was willing to give up some control
for the thrill. 2=During most of my life, I found some
danger or risk exciting, but only if I had control of
the situation. 3=During most of my life, I have
avoided risky situations because I believe that it is
better to be safe than sorry. The mean for pilot
participants was 2.5.
Computer playfulness was measured using a 1-7
Likert style scale where 1 represents Not at All and 7
represents All the Way.
The questions asked
participants how they would characterize themselves
when they use microcomputers. When presented
with specific adjectives, they chose 1-7 to match the
description of themselves when interacting with
microcomputers. Table 2 shows the Mean for the
responses.
Table 2: Computer Playfulness Response
Means
Adjective

Figure 6: Heatmaps Generated from Eye
Tracking Data of Participants 1 (left) and 2
(right) Viewing the Email Inbox
Further reflection indicates that EEG may be
triangulated with emotion, eye tracking, screen
capture, survey, and qualitative debrief to more fully
understand a person’s experience while engaging
with a phishing campaign. Context of the session,
individual characteristics, and personal account of
mental processing are all necessary to better
understand such varied results as may be obtained
using biometric tools. This variation in human
mental processing is illustrated by the brain
activations of the six participants who themselves
vary. Yet we may better understand the impact of
SETA programs with these tools providing richer

Mean

Spontaneous

3.25

Unimaginative

3.75

Flexible

6.25

Creative

5.25

Playful

4.5

Unoriginal

3.25

Uninventive

3.25

Finally, participants were asked to indicate one
of the following measures of specific risk that we
developed to measure risk perception in this study.
1=I believe that the overall riskiness of the Email
system is very high. 2=I believe that the overall
riskiness of the Email system is very low. The mean
for participants was 1.5.
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4. The Maturation of our Model Toward
a Specific Training Platform

Security Threat
Novelty

P1 +

Risk Perception
P3 -

There is an emergent model out of this research
that is shown in Figure 7. The model is based on the
following premise. As mentioned earlier, the key
dependent variable of interest is the actual behavior
of the individual. Here the actual behavior relates to
whether an individual fell for a phishing attack or
not. Based on our research and literature, we argue
for the following model. The model is shown as an
input-process-output model.
The key inputs into the model are the actual work
task being performed by an individual, which in our
case was answering office emails. The actual work
task relates to individual performance. The task
complexity in this case would be rated as medium.
The threat is as it relates to the anomaly in the
individual’s task that may result in an information
security breach. In the case of our study, this related
to the phishing attempt designed by the researcher.
As individuals went through the process of doing
their tasks, two key variables that influenced actions
were the risk perception of an individual and the
cognitive load experienced by the individual. The
neuroscience-based approach illustrated in this paper
suggests that there may be a difference between how
people act and what is going on in their minds. Based
on this research, we suggest the following
propositions:
P1: The greater the novelty of the threat, the greater
the risk perception of the task.
P2: The more complicated the task, the more
cognitive load it presents.
P3: The greater the risk perception, the greater the
likelihood the individual’s actions will be secure.
P4: The greater the cognitive load, the less likely the
actions of an individual will be secure.
More broadly, the emergent model argues that the
focus of security training needs to incorporate both
the threat novelty and task complexity. Those are the
key determinants of cognitive load that in turn lead to
secure behavioral actions.

Secure Behavior
action
P4 -

Task Complexity

P2 +

Training Focus

Cognitive load

Psychological Process

Outcome

Figure 7: Emergent Model

5. Conclusion
Email is still one of the most widely used tools in
the workforce to communicate and collaborate.
Hence it is crucial that employees know how to
identify and avoid phishing emails as the best way to
thwart a phishing attack. The pilot test presented
here, simulated an aspect of a regular day at the
office to see what a person experienced while
interacting with their email inbox and working
through tasks, how their brain was affected, and the
emotions experienced. Neurophysiological tools
helped illustrate the thought processes behind
participants’ statements and actions; combined with
consideration of individual characteristics, these tools
may help shed more light on human behavior.
Getting a full view of the lived experience of a
person during a phishing attack may prove helpful in
advancing the effectiveness of SETA programs. This
study seems to give credence to the notion that
proximity of training to engagement with a phishing
campaign may have the most influence on the level
of awareness and success that a person has in
successfully resisting a phishing campaign. In future
work, we will expand the testing environment to
incorporate the emergent model presented here and
expand the sample population to industry
professionals with a range of IT and non-IT
experience.
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